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WASHINGTON CASE LAW
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Impeachment of Verdicts by Jurors' Affidavits. Gardner v.
Malone,1 presents this problem: In what circumstances and by what
evidence may a jury verdict be impeached for alleged misconduct in
the jury-room?
As an original proposition it would seem that, consonant with our
notions of a fair trial, an improperly reached verdict should be subject
to timely impeachment in every case. And further, there is no more
logical means of proving such misconduct than by the testimony or
affidavits of the jurors themselves. This, however, is not the law. Most
American jurisdictions will not admit the testimony or affidavits of
jurors to impeach their verdicts under any circumstances.2 This rule
has two bases. The first is Vaise v. Delaval,' written by Lord Mans-
field in 1785. Premised on the idea that testimony of a juror regarding
his own misconduct is inadmissible, while that of an eavesdropper to
the same act may be heard, Vaise is obviously an historic anomaly.4
The second basis is both substantial and contemporary. It is the
policy favoring stable and certain verdicts. The considerations mani-
fested therein include: rapid and conclusive termination of litigation,
hopefully with verdict and judgment; preventing harassment of jurors
by disappointed litigants; discouragement of jury tampering; and
maintaining the secrecy of deliberation to encourage frank and free
discussion by all jurors. This public interest in stability and certainty
must be balanced against that of the individual litigant in a fair trial.'
1 160 Wash. Dec. 840, 376 P2d 651 (1962).
2 See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2354 nn.1 & 2 (McNaughton Rev. 1961) (hereinafter
cited as WIGmoRE), where it is asserted that the exclusionary rule prevails in all but
eleven states, and possibly the federal courts. As will be discussed, infra, those states
which have relaxed the rule, including Washington, follow variants of the so-called
"Iowa" rule, as set forth in Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195, 210
(1866).3 1 Term. Rep. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785). The brief report reads: "Vaise
against Delaval 1785. Affidavit of a juror that the jury, having been divided, tossed
up, and that the plaintiff had won, rejected.
"Upon a motion by Law for a rule to set aside a verdict, upon an affidavit of two
juorors, who swore that the jury, being divided in their opinion, tossed up, and that
the plaintiff's friends won, in which was cited, Hale v. Cove, 1 Stra. 642.
"Per Lord Mansfield, Ch. J. The Court cannot (a) receive such an affidavit from
any of the jurymen themselves, in all of whom such conduct is a very high mis-
demeanor (b) ; but in every such case the Court must derive their knowledge from
some other source: such as some person having seen the transaction through a window,
or some other means. Rule refused." (Footnotes omitted.)
'Indeed, it is doubtful whether Vaise was a proper statement of the law in England
when written. See WIGMOpE § 2352.
The policies pro and con are summarized in WIMORE § 2353. Another reason
suggested by that author (§ 2348) is that allowing such affidavits would be a violation
of the "parol evidence rule." But, this rule has no intrinsic significance, being only a
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Considering these conflicting and substantial interests, the majority
position-excluding all testimony of jurors concerning their misconduct
-seems indefensible, because it excludes what must normally be the
only evidence of misconduct, thereby denying the losing party a fair
trial. Indeed, this exclusionary rule has been severely criticized.6 A
minority of American courts have adopted a compromise approach,
which allows the testimony or affidavits of jurors to impeach their
verdict so long as the misconduct does not "inhere" in the verdict.-
But, as one commentator has pointed out, drawing the line between
matters which do and do not "inhere" has been a difficult task, espe-
cially without reasoned consideration of the problem in the light of a
jury's proper function.' Lacking also have been empirical data on how
juries actually arrive at verdicts and comparative studies showing the
result of the other policies. Probably the leading judicial expression of the majority
view is McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915). The minority position is stated
in Wright, note 2 supra, and State v. Kociolek, 20 N.J. 92, 98, 118 A.2d 812, 815
(1955). A succinct statement of this more liberal approach is found in Perry v.
Bailey, 12 Kan. 415, 419 (1874): "Public policy forbids that a matter resting in the
personal consciousness of one juror should be received to overthrow the verdict, be-
cause, being personal it is not accessible to other testimony .... But as to overt acts,
they are accessible to the knowledge of all the jurors. If one affirms misconduct, the
remaining twelve can deny. One cannot disturb the action of twelve. It is useless
to tamper with one, for the eleven may be heard."
1 See, e.g., WIGM.ORE §§ 2345, 2353; Comment, Impeachnwtt of Jury Verdicts, 25
U. CHI. L. REV. 360 (1958); Note, 37 VA. L. REV. 849 (1951); Comment, New Trial:
Use of Testimony of Jurors to Set Aside Verdicts, 47 MICH. L. REv. 261 (1948) ;
UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 41 & 44; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 301 (1942), set
out in note 7 infra. Another possible defect of the exclusionary rule is that it may
work a denial of due process of law in some circumstances. See Note, 14 OKLA. L.
REV. 533 (1961).
7 WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1961) defines "inhere": "to be
inherent: to be a fixed element or attribute"; and "inherent": "structural or involved
in the constitution or essential character of something: belonging by nature or settled
habit." Clearly the word "inhere" (or "inherent") of itself has no particular signifi-
cance. Rather, it is only after a court has made a policy decision and determined what
matters should be held "inherent" that it becomes meaningful. Thus it is not surprising
that even the American courts which allow affidavits in some circumstances are often
juxtaposed as to what matters do and do not "inhere." For example, in Kansas
"quotient verdicts" do not, and are subject to impeachment by juror testimony. Kirk-
patrick v. Wickmire, 138 Kan. 230, 25 P.2d 371 (1933). In Washington, on the other
hand, they do "inhere" in the verdict, and are impeachable only due to a specific Rule
of Pleading, Practice and Procedure (59.04W). Gardner v. Malone, note 1 supra;
Goodman v. Cody, 1 Wash. Terr. 329, 34 Am. Rep. 808 (1871). Rule 301, MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942), is probably as good a general statement of the impeach-
able types of misconduct as can be found: "Whenever any act, event or condition
known to a member of a petit or grand jury is a subject of lawful inquiry, any witness,
including every member of the jury, may testify to any material matter, including any
statement or conduct or condition of any member of the jury, whether the matter
occured or existed in the jury room or elsewhere, and whether during the deliberations
of the jury, or in reaching or reporting its verdict or finding, or in any other circum-
stances, except that upon an issue as to the validity of a verdict or indictment no evi-
dence shall be received concerning the effect which anything had upon the mind of a
juror as tending to cause him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment
or concerning the mental processes by which it was reached."
8 Comment, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 360 (1958).
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effect on this process of permitting impeachment for various types of
misconduct.
Washington's minority stand on juror testimony has recently been
treated at some length by Judge Weaver in Gardner v. Malone.' The
core of the opinion is:
[W] e believe a workable rule has evolved from our decisions. The
crux of the problem is whether that to which the juror testifies (orally
or by affidavit) in support of a motion for a new trial, inheres in the
verdict. If it does, it may not be considered; if it does not it may be
considered by the court. .... 10
Before considering the facts and significance of Gardner, a brief survey
of the earlier cases is in order.
In 1871, the Supreme Court of Washington Territory upheld the
setting aside of a "quotient verdict" by means of jurors' affidavits. 1
While the method of computation "inheres" in the verdict, 2 a territorial
statute specifically permitted jurors' affidavits to show alleged miscon-
duct as a ground for a new trial, if the verdict was arrived at by
"chance or lot."' The court construed this to include a "quotient
verdict." This statute has survived various reenactments and codifica-
tions, and now appears substantially unchanged as Rule of Pleading,
Practice and Procedure 59.04W.' It should be noted that to come
within the "chance or lot" requisite of the Rule, a "quotient verdict"
must be the result of an agreement to accept it as binding before the
average is calculated.' Thus, when an average award is computed and
0 160 Wash. Dec. 840, 376 P2d 651 (1962).10 160 Wash. Dec. at 844, 376 P2d at 654.
" Goodman v. Cody, 1 Wash. Terr. 329, 34 Am. Rep. 808 (1871).
12 This is the Washington view, hut some other jurisdictions are contra; see note
7 supra.
's Laws of Washington Territory, Ch. 21, § 278(2) (1869).
14 The history of Rule 59.04W is traced in footnote 2 of Gardner, 160 Wash. Dec. at
842, 376 P.2d at 653. The Rule provides, in part: "The former verdict... may be va-
cated and a new trial granted... for any one of the following causes... : (2) Miscon-
duct of... jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors shall have been induced
to assent to any general or special verdict or finding on any question or questions sub-
mitted to the jury by the court, other and different from his own conclusions, and
arrived at by a resort to the determination of chance or lot, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavits of one or more of the jurors; ...."
15 Conover v. Nehr-Ross Co., 38 Wash. 172, 80 Pac. 281 (1905) ; Stanley v. Stanley,
32 Wash. 489, 73 Pac. 596 (1903) ; Watson v. Reed, 15 Wash. 440, 46 Pac. 647 (1896).
A more recent and rather curious case which was held to come within the "chance or
lot" criteria is Vogt v. Curtis, 200 Wash. 692, 94 P.2d 761 (1939). There the jury
had reached a nine-to-three impasse after almost eleven hours of deliberation. To re-
solve this the three agreed to cut cards, with the "loser" to join the nine. The agree-
ment was carried out and a ten-to-two verdict returned, which was successfully im-
peached. A Note in 15 WAsH. L. REv. 124 (1940), argues that the case does not
come within the statute (now Rule 59.04W), since it was actually a unanimous agree-
ment to render a ten-to-two verdict, as a face-saving device, which inhered in the
verdict and was not the result of "chance or lot."
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later adopted by the jury as its verdict, there is no misconduct.'
While the statute provided but a narrow exception to the common
law rule against impeachment by jurors, Washington judicially rejected
this strict rule in State v. Parker,7 in 1901. There, a conviction for
grand larceny was set aside on the affidavits of a juror showing remarks
made by another juror during the deliberations. These remarks were
that the other juror knew the defendant was guilty because he was a
member of a "gang of toughs" who had committed other crimes. The
curious feature of Parker is that the court apparently assumed that the
common law rule of Vaise was not the law in Washington, and that the
statutory grounds for granting a new trial were not exclusive. The court
adopted this position:
In considering the affidavits filed, we entirely discard those portions
which may tend to impeach the verdict of the jurors, and consider only
those facts stated in relation to misconduct of the juror, and which in
no way inhere in the verdict itself. It is not for the juror to say what
effect the remarks may have had upon his verdict, but he may state
facts, and from them the court will determine what was the probable
effect upon the verdict. (Emphasis added.)"'
Although this passage has become the test of admissibility in Wash-
ington (and, indeed, was held "dispositive" of Gardner'"), its language
is inconsistent and has caused no little confusion in the cases. As
Judge Weaver wrote in Gardner: "Our decisions are replete with the
statement that 'a juror's testimony or affidavit is not receivable to
impeach his own verdict.' ,2,o But, like Parker, many of these cases
then allowed non-inhering misconduct to be shown and the verdict to
be set aside. This is nothing more or less than impeaching the verdict
16 Oliver v. Taylor, 119 Wash. 190, 205 Pac. 746 (1922) ; Loy v. Northern Pac. R.
Co., 77 Wash. 25, 137 Pac. 446 (1913) ; Wiles v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 66 Wash. 337,
119 Pac. 810 (1911). See also Note, 9 WASH. L. REv. 235 (1934).
1' 25 Wash. 405, 65 Pac. 776 (1901).
18 25 Wash. at 415, 65 Pac. at 779. While the court did cite cases from Iowa,
Kansas, Tennessee and Texas, there was no mention of Vaise v. Delaval, or the
rule in the majority of American jurisdictions-nor were the apposite policies on
either side discussed.
19 160 Wash. Dec. at 844, 376 P.2d at 653. Query: Should the same rule control
civil and criminal cases? The Washington court apparently thinks it should, since
criminal and civil cases have been cited indiscriminately without discussion in Gardner
and earlier cases. However, it would seem that the interest of the criminal defendant
in liberty should receive greater protection than that afforded the civil litigant's
property. This follows from the premise that liberty is beyond monetary valuation, a
premise evinced, e.g., in the procedure that requires guilt to be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, whereas evidence in a civil action need only preponderate. Therefore.
while it is probably justifiable to exclude all evidence of the effects of misconduct in
order to preserve stability, it is submitted that in criminal cases any fact of misconduct
(whether "inherent" or not) should be subject to impeachment by a juror's affidavit or
testimony.
20 160 Wash. Dec., at 844, 376 P.2d at 654.
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by the juror's evidence. Thus, the italicized part of the above passage
is ambiguous, since if the court did "entirely discard those portions
which may tend to impeach the verdict," there would be nothing left
with which to show misconduct.
In addition to the ambiguities raised by Parker, there are several
other considerations which permeate and cloud the cases in this area:
Granting that the affidavit is properly admissible, has the party request-
ing a new trial carried his burden to show that the misconduct actually
occurred, e.g., in the face of counter-affidavits? 2 Does the alleged mis-
conduct show prejudice, as a matter of law?22 If so, has the requesting
party shown that the trial judge's refusal to grant a new trial was
such an abuse of discretion as to demand a reversal?22 These com-
plications, together with the regrettably frequent opinions which fail
to make clear on which of the bases the decision rests,2 ' tend to ob-
scure the question and render difficult both analysis and prediction of
future results.
Notwithstanding the above difficulties, it is probably true, as Gardner
states, "that a workable rule has evolved from" the Washington cases.2"
Thus, affidavits of jurors have been held properly admissible to show
21 Brant v. Sweet Clinic, 167 Wash. 166, 8 P2d 972 (1932) ; Stevens v. Depue, 151
Wash. 641, 276 Pac. 882 (1929).
22 State v. Knapp, 194 Wash. 286, 77 P.2d 985 (1938) ; Hafner v. United States
Fid. & Guar. Co., 126 Wash. 670, 219 Pac. 16 (1923). In Mulka v. Keyes, 41 Wn.2d
427, 249 P.2d 972 (1952), the court stated that misconduct is either prejudicial or not-
and if not, it is improper to include the misconduct as grounds for a new trial due to
"lack of substantial justice" (now under Rule 59.04W [9]).
23 Nelson v. Placanica, 33 Wn.2d 523, 206 P.2d 296 (1949). If a new trial was
granted below, it will take an even greater showing to secure a reversal than to upset
a denial. O'Brien v. Seattle, 52 Wn.2d 543, 327 P.2d 433 (1958) ; Dibley v. Peters,
200 Wash. 100, 93 P.2d 720 (1939).
24 State v. Nicely, 171 Wash. 439, 18 P.2d 503 (1933) ; Taylor v. Kitsap County
Transp. Co., 158 Wash. 404, 290 Pac. 996 (1930) ; Davidson v. Clow, 149 Wash. 414,
271 Pac. 78 (1928) ; Lander v. Shannon, 148 Wash. 93, 268 Pac. 145 (1928) ; State
v. McMullen, 142 Wash. 7, 252 Pac. 108 (1927) ; State v. Adamo, 128 Wash. 419, 223
Pac. 9 (1924); State v. Cook, 113 Wash. 391, 194 Pac. 401 (1920); Wagoner v.
Warn, 88 Wash. 688, 153 Pac. 1072 (1915) ; Lindquist v. Pacific Coast Coal Co., 86
Wash. 408, 150 Pac. 619 (1915).
25 160 Wash. Dec. at 844, 376 P.2d at 654. However, there are a few particularly
murky areas where even a "workable rule" is not evident. In Purdy v. Sherman, 74
Wash. 309, 133 Pac. 440 (1913), after an item of damages was improperly submitted
to the jury, the court refused to consider (in order to preserve the verdict) a juror's
affidavit that the item was not considered in reaching the verdict, since the matter
"inhered" in the verdict. But, in DeHoney v. Gjarde, 134 Wash. 647, 236 Pac. 290(1925), the court held there was no prejudicial error, when an exhibit was improperly
sent to the jury, for the reason that jurors' affidavits showed the exhibit was not
examined until after agreement on the verdict. Herndon v. Seattle, 11 Wn.2d 88, 118
P.2d 421 (1941), appears to involve the same inconsistent use of affidavits evinced in
DeHmoey.
Improper consideration of liability insurance by the jury is another confused prob-
lem. While Lloyd v. Mowery, 158 Wash. 341, 290 Pac. 710 (1930) and Brant v.
Sweet Clinic, 167 Wash. 166, 8 P.2d 972 (1932), seem to allow this matter to be
raised by a juror's affidavit, Martin v. Monk, 173 Wash. 134, 22 P.2d 51 (1933), asserts
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that matters not in evidence were considered by the jury,2" that jurors
made an unauthorized view of the place in litigation,27 and that the
bailiff or others improperly participated in the jury's deliberations.28
On the other hand, misconduct held inadmissible includes: errors in
calculating the verdicts;2" failure to use, understand, or correctly inter-
pret evidence properly before the jury;" failure to read or understand
the court's instructions; 31 or making other erroneous assumptions as to
the applicable law;3 2 and following improper procedures in reaching
the verdict.3
such to be "inherent" in the verdict and inadmissible (while citing Brant with ap-
proval!) The latest case on this point, Kellerher v. Porter, 29 Wn.2d 650, 664, 189
P.2d 223, 230 (1948), adds nothing but confusion: "Assuming that the 'talk about
insurance' during the deliberations of the jury was improper, we think that the affi-
davits themselves fairly show that such talk had no effect upon the jury in arriving
at its verdict. We are therefore unable to say that the trial court abused its dis-
cretion in its ruling." (Emphasis added.)
26 Dibley v. Peters, 200 Wash. 100, 93 P.2d 720 (1939) (juror made independent
investigation of certain matters in issue, and related his conclusions to panel) ; Lyberg
v. Holz, 145 Wash. 316, 259 Pac. 1087 (1927) (juror related his personal knowledge
that plaintiff had refused settlement, supposedly to lay foundation for criminal prose-
cution) ; State v. Burke, 124 Wash. 632, 215 Pac. 31 (1923) (jurors obtained magni-
fying glass-not in evidence-in order to conduct experiments on certain exhibits);
State v. McChesney, 114 Wash. 113, 194 Pac. 551 (1921) (juror related personal
knowledge regarding other crimes defendant supposedly had committed, implying he
was thereby guilty of the present charge) ; Bouton-Perkins Lumber Co. v. Huston,
81 Wash. 678, 143 Pac. 146 (1914) (jurors examined pamphlet containing state forest
laws) ; State v. Lorenzy, 59 Wash. 308, 109 Pac. 1064 (1910) (juror stated he knew
place to be house of ill repute, when contrary testimony was in evidence).
27 Woodruff v. Ewald, 127 Wash. 61, 219 Pac. 851 (1923). Maryland Cas. Co. v.
Seattle Elec. Co., 75 Wash. 430, 134 Pac. 1097 (1913), also involved an unauthorized
view. While stating that juror affidavits would be proper to show this misconduct,
the court held that the statute (now Rule 59.04W) providing that misconduct "may"
be shown by affidavit, meant "must" be shown by affidavit. Thus, the granting below
of a new trial not based on affidavits was reversed. The curious thing about this is
that the case did not come within the statutory grounds of misconduct ("chance or
lot") in the first place. Further, the affidavits, whether by jurors or third parties,
must be of personal knowledge, not information or belief-and hearsay is obviously
not competent. Aliverti v. Walla Walla, 162 Wash. 487, 298 Pac. 698 (1931) ; Johnson
v. Smith, 118 Wash. 146, 203 Pac. 56 (1921); State v. Murphy, 13 Wash. 229, 43
Pac. 44 (1895).
28 O'Brien v. Seattle, 52 Wn.2d 543, 327 P.2d 433 (1958) ; State v. Rose, 43 Wn.2d
553, 262 P.2d 194 (1953).
29 Marvin v. Yates, 26 Wash. 50, 66 Pac. 131 (1901).
30 Henslin v. Pratt, 119 Wash. 443, 205 Pac. 867 (1922) ; State v. Lyle, 105 Wash.
435, 178 Pac. 468 (1919); Allen v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 76 Wash. 51, 135
Pac. 621 (1913) ; Ralton v. Sherwood Logging Co., 54 Wash. 254, 103 Pac. 28 (1909).
31 State v. McKenzie, 56 Wn.2d 897, 355 P.2d 834 (1960); Hosner v. Olympia
Shingle Co., 128 Wash. 152, 22 Pac. 466 (1924) ; State v. Whipple, 124 Wash. 578,
215 Pac. 14 (1923).
32 Eyak River Packing Co. v. Huglen, 143 Wash. 229, 255 Pac. 123 (1927) ; State
v. Gay, 82 Wash. 423, 144 Pac. 711 (1914) ; State v. Holmes, 12 Wash. 169, 40 Pac.
735 (1895).
33 Bender v. White, 199 Wash. 510, 92 P.2d 268 (1939) (jury allegedly rendered
verdict even though deadlocked on issue of contributory negligence) ; Hamilton v.
Snyder, 182 Wash. 688, 48 P.2d 245 (1935) (immediately upon entering jury-room
foreman took informal poll, and finding eleven-to-one vote, he signed the verdict,
refused to read the instructions and marched protesting jurors back into court)
Collins v. Barmon, 145 Wash. 383, 260 Pac. 245 (1927) (allegedly biased foreman)
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Two recent cases, Johnston v. Sound Transfer Co."4 and Smith v.
American Mail Line, Ltd.,5 further confused the picture. In Johnston,
which was an action for personal injuries sustained in being thrown
from a horse, the court rejected affidavits showing that two jurors
related their personal riding experiences to the panel. The opinion
stated "the only instance in which a juror's affidavit may be used to
impeach the verdict is pursuant to... (now Rule 59.04W) .... The
present rule... has long been construed to prohibit a juror from im-
peaching the verdict by affidavit." (Emphasis added.)3" In Smith,
appellant offered jurors' affidavits to the effect that the damage award
had been increased to offset the Jones Act deduction for contributory
negligence, and to provide fees for the respondent's attorney. After
recognizing the majority view that juror affidavits are never admissible,
the court stated:
However, in this state, by court rule, an exception has been made to
the prevailing common-law rule. Rule of Pleading, Practice and Pro-
cedure 59.04W. . . . Since there is no allegation in either of the two
affidavits that the verdict was arrived at by means of chance or lot
(the onily instanwe where such affidavits would be admissible), the affi-
davits cannot be considered. (Emphasis added.) 37
The language from these cases suggests that the grounds for a new trial
in Rule 59.04W are exclusive, and that the "chance or lot" proviso
therein is the only deviation from the common law rule in Washington.
However, in both cases the court referred the reader to Dibley v.
Peters,"8 where affidavits were offered showing that a juror made an
independent investigation of certain matters in issue and related his
conclusions to the jury. These affidavits were held to be admissible,
since they dealt with facts which did not "inhere" in the verdict. Thus,
it seems fair to state that after Smith the Washington position on juror
affidavits was not altogether dear.
Gardner v. Malone"9 was an action for personal injuries arising out
of an automobile accident. Plaintiff appealed, following a verdict for
State v. Aker, 54 Wash. 342, 103 Pac. 420 (1909) (allegedly coerced consent to
verdict). The earlier cases concerned admissibility of jurors' affidavits are sum-
marized in Note, 4 WASH. L. Rxv. 78 (1929).
3453 Wn2d 630, 335 P2d 598 (1959).
35 58 Wn2d 361, 363 P.2d 133 (1961).
3853 Wn.2d at 631, 335 P.2d at 599.
3a 58 Wn.2d at 369, 363 P2d at 137.38 200 Wash. 100, 93 P.2d 720 (1939).
39 160 Wash. Dec. 840, 376 P2d 651 (1962). On March 11, 1963, the court corrected
the opinion in Gardner by deleting the following language, which originally appeared
in 160 Wash. Dec. at 849, 376 P.2d at 657: "Since this type of speculation could not
have been introduced on the trial of the instant case, it is proper to brand its consid-
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the defendant and denial of a new trial, offering affidavits of jurors
alleging four types of misconduct. The supreme court rejected, with-
out discussion, the implications of Johnston and Smith that Rule
59.04W is exclusive, and reasserted the earlier Washington position
that affidavits showing facts of misconduct which do not "inhere" in
the verdict may be received."0 However, affidavits showing that the
jurors did not understand the meaning of "imputable" in the trial
judge's instructions were summarily rejected, since the alleged mis-
conduct "inhered" in the verdict." Secondly, the affidavits showed
that a juror, who had denied knowing the defendent on voir dire,
stated during the deliberations that he "had traded wheat and stock
with" him. 2 Since the juror in question later denied this under oath,
the court accepted the trial court's finding, implicit in the denial of a
new trial, that the misconduct did not occur. The affidavits also
related that three members of the jury had made an intentional visit
to the scene of the accident. This was held admissible and the mis-
conduct prejudicial. The final alleged item of misconduct was that
some of the jurors (during deliberations) discussed the probable
effects of a judgment for the plaintiff, including: "If we give a
judgment for $100,000.00 and the other boys' fathers will sue Malone,
and they will take his whole wheat ranch.... You bet, that is exactly
what will happen.... We don't want anything like that to happen." 3
This consideration of matters not in evidence was held to be miscon-
duct. Having found the two described items of misconduct to be the
kind provable by juror's affidavits, the court prescribed the following
test to determine whether the matters were sufficiently prejudicial to
constitute an abuse of discretion:
"'If, upon a consideration of the whole of the pertinent record, it
is reasonably doubtful whether or not the improper conduct affected
the amount of the verdict or the decision of any other material issue,
the verdict should be set aside by the trial judge; if, in such a case,
a new trial is not granted, there is an abuse of discretion by the trial
ju d g e. . . . , ,,44
eration as misconduct of the jury. It had the same prejudicial effect as if it had been
introduced at the trial." The correction, which has no bearing on this Note, is reported
in 60 Wn.2d at -, 379 P.2d at 218.
40 160 Wash. Dec. at 844, 376 P.2d at 654. See the text accompanying notes 10 and
19 supra.
41 The court did not set out this allegation, but it may be found in Brief for Ap-
pellant, at pp. 17-18.
42 160 Wash. Dec. at 847, 376 P.2d at 655.
43 160 Wash. Dec. at 849, 376 P.2d at 655.
44 160 Wash. Dec. at 850, 376 P.2d at 657, quoting Lyberg v. Holz, 145 Wash. 316,
320, 259 Pac. 1087, 1088 (1927), which in turn quoted Moore v. Ivey, 277 S.VWT. 106
(Tex. 1925).
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On its facts, Gardner is not a particularly significant case. Rejecting
affidavits showing misunderstanding of instructions, or upholding the
trial judge's finding that affidavits were rebutted, or reversing because
of a prejudicial view is not a departure from prior Washington cases.45
Whether consideration of matters not in evidence may be shown by
affidavits is not as clear. There are, however, significant differences
between Gardner and preceding instances where such matters have
been found "inherent" (or non-prejudicial or not an abuse of discre-
tion) ."6 Thus, on its facts Gardner seems consistent with earlier Wash-
ington decisions. But Gardner is of moment in at least three respects.
First, it clarifies the frequent statements in Washington opinions that
((a juror's testimony or affidavit is not receivable to impeach his own
verdict,""' by showing that the court has been using the word "im-
peach" in a narrow context. Specifically, "impeach" has only been
used to denote attempted showings of misconduct which "inhere" in
the verdict. When "non-inhering" misconduct is offered, the court
receives the affidavits to set aside the verdict, but scrupulously avoids
labeling this as impeachment. Clearly, they are one and the same
process, but once the magic words are appreciated the puzzling lan-
guage of the cases makes more sense. Thus, it is literally true in
Washington that (except for the "chance or lot" provision) jurors can-
not testify to "impeach" their verdict, but can do so to "set it aside."
Secondly, Gardner removes any doubt as to the construction of Rule
59.04W. It is not exclusive. Thus, what the court apparently meant
45. See re: instructions, cases cited note 30 supra; affidavits rebutted, cases cited
note 21 supra; and prejudicial views, cases cited note 27 supra. It should be noted
that the court distinguished Brennan v. Seattle, 46 Wash. 427, 90 Pac. 434 (1907),
on the grounds that the view there was unintentional, the juror disclosed his mis-
conduct in court during the trial, and the jury was instructed to disregard it. In
Gardyer, three jurors made an intentional detour to visit the scene, where the condi-
tions had changed, and related this in secret to the panel. Thus, unlike Brennan, the
view in Gardiner was held prejudicial.
4" Thus, while the statements made by a juror in Lindquist v. Pacific Coast Coal
Co., 86 Wash. 408, 150 Pac. 619 (1915), are essentially similar to those in Gardner, the
decision in Lindquist upholding the refusal to grant a new trial, appears to have been
based on either successful contradiction by counter-affidavits, or no abuse of dis-
cretion by the trial judge. Likewise, Nelson v. Placanica, 33 Wn.2d 523, 206 P2d 296
(1949), apparently rests on the trial judge's discretion or no finding of prejudice,
rather than inadmissibility due to "inhering" in the verdict. Johnston v. Sound Trans-
fer Co., 53 Wn.2d 630, 335 P.2d 598 (1959), differs in one significant aspect. There,
the juror's personal knowledge of horseback riding was not related to the facts of the
specific case. It was general in nature, and probably not unlike what most jurors
think they know about the subject matter of every case. Considered in this sense, the
court apparently decided that, every juror having some degree of general knowledge
in most areas, to admit such affidavits would destroy the stability of too many verdicts.
This sort of misconduct was called "inherent," in order to separate it from such
situations as Gardner, where the interest of the litigant in a fair trial prevails due to
the improper consideration of knowledge peculiar to the particular case.
47 160 Wash. Dec. at 844, 376 P.2d at 654.
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in Johnston and Smith is that when a fact "inheres" in the verdict
(Johnston) or relates to the effect of misconduct (Smith), then, in
those instances, the only exception to the common law exclusionary rule
is that provided by Rule 59.04W concerning "chance or lot." However,
when the matter relates to neither "inherent" facts nor effects of mis-
conduct on the jury, affidavits are admissible.
Finally, the court distinguished among questions of admissibility,
burden of proof, prejudice and abuse of discretion-and set forth the
"reasonably doubtful" standard (quoted above) to determine whether
there has been an abuse of discretion. Gardner still leaves one major
problem: This is the question of what "inheres." The opinion states:
One test is whether the facts alleged are linked to the juror's motive,
intent, or belief, or describe their effect upon him; if so, the statements
cannot be considered for they inhere in the verdict and impeach it ...
Another test is whether that to which the juror testifies can be rebutted
by other testimony without probing a juror's mental processes. (Em-
phasis added. ) 4 8
The court further quotes language from Maryland Cas. Co. v. Seattle
Elec. Co.,49 setting forth yet a third test, which would permit any facts
to be shown by jurors' affidavits, while excluding only evidence of
effects. Thus, the first test would bar all effects, and those facts which
are "linked to the juror's motives, intent or belief." The second test
would exclude effects and those facts which are not rebuttable "without
probing a juror's mental processes." The third is a simple fact-effect
distinction. Clearly, these tests are not the same. Indeed, the third
test is repudiated on the same page of Gardner when the court speaks
of "eliminating allegations ... of facts that we believe inhere in the
verdict." (Emphasis added.)5" While the second test may be used in
some other jurisdictions,5' neither it nor the third is consistent with the
Washington cases. For example, the affidavits in Johnston (as to jurors'
horseback riding experiences) would surely be permissible under either
of these tests. 2 Therefore, it would seem that the first test is controlling
48 Ibid.
49 75 Wash. 430, 134 Pac. 1097 (1913) ; quoted at 160 Wash. Dec. 846, 376 P.2d 655.
50 160 Wash. Dec. at 847, 376 P.2d at 655.
51 See, e.g., Hackaday v. Brackelsburg, 248 Iowa 1346, 85 N.W.2d 514 (1957);
Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1866) ; Kirkpatrick v. Wickmire,
138 Kan. 230, 25 P.2d 371 (1933) ; Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 415 (1874) (see note 5
supra) ; State v. Kociolek, 20 N.J. 92, 118 A.2d 812 (1955) ; UNIFORm RULES OF Evi-
DENCE 41 & 44; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 301 (1942), set out in note 7 supra.
52 See the discussion of Johnston in note 46 supra. Another recent case which is
contrary to the second and third tests is State v. McKenzie, 56 Wn.2d 897, 355 P.2d
834 (1960).
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as to what "inheres" in Washington verdicts. Hence, all effects are to
be excluded, as are those facts which are "linked to the juror's motive,
intent or belief."
The nebulousness of the Washington test, and indeed, of the whole
logical quagmire of "effects" and "inherent facts," is but symptomatic
of a second and more fundamental problem: What is the real basis of
the "inherent fact" concept? While a fact-effect distinction has some
basis in reason, to speak of facts which do and do not "inhere" has no
logical significance, save as a conclusion. It is.pure sophistry to say
that such statements by a juror as,53 We don't want D to lose his ranch
or I know D is guilty because he is a member of that gang, are any less
"linked to the juror's motive, intent, or belief" than I rode horses for
years and that accident was the rider's fault or I will not read the
court's instructions, because the law is ... or plaintiff's damages are
$2000 plus $2000, which equals $5000. Whether each statement was or
was not made is a fact. The "linking" test prescribed by the court can-
not separate these facts into two distinct categories--"inhering" and
"non-inhering"--nor can any other verbal shorthand. At best, such
tests may aid in classifying the results and predicting future decisions.
The real question for the court in each case is whether this is the sort of
fact which should be allowed to impeach the verdict. This is simply a
policy decision. The Washington court has tried to formulate a work-
able rule in light of the conflicting interests of stability and justice in
the individual case. Absent meaningful data showing how juries actu-
ally reach verdicts and the effect on this process of allowing impeach-
ment-and looking to what the cases decide, not what they say-one
cannot say that the Washington court has not developed a salutary and
workable compromise. RicHARD E. KEEF.
TORTS
Assumption of the Risk. In Siragusa v. Swedish Hospital' the
Washington Supreme Court abolished the assumption of risk defense in
suits brought by employees against their employers. Overruling prior
decisions that were inconsistent, the court held that an employer has a
duty to exercise reasonable care to provide his employees with a rea-
53These statements are paraphrases of the affidavits in various Washington cases
rather than quotes, since in many of the cases the exact language of the affidavits has
not been set out.
1160 Wash. Dec. 314, 373 P.2d 767 (1962).
1963]
